Human Rights
Taha Mousavi Mirkalaei; Savalan Mohammadzadeh
Abstract
The present article includes a comparative study of the Islamic and Western approaches to human rights, and the general orientation of this review concentrates on the Universality and Relativism of human rights. The Western approach claims the universality of these rights and believes they are ultra-spot ...
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The present article includes a comparative study of the Islamic and Western approaches to human rights, and the general orientation of this review concentrates on the Universality and Relativism of human rights. The Western approach claims the universality of these rights and believes they are ultra-spot and timeless, despite the diversity of cultures, ethnicity and religions. Thus, it supposes its innovative human rights are extensible elsewhere in the world. The Islamic approach, emphasizing Human Nature as a common unity of all humans, also believes in universal ultra-spot and timeless human rights. However, it essentially and fundamentally disagrees with the western approach. Meanwhile, religious intellectualism accepts the universality of western human rights despite relying on the philosophical foundations of relativism. The present article analyses the existing duality in the positions of intellectualism due to the current dialectic between Islam and western human rights law.
Bostjan M. Zupancic
Abstract
This paper is a Chapter from the author’s latest book, ON THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Eleven Publishing, 2019. The work is an attempt at a critical understanding of the spirit of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as implemented, by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ...
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This paper is a Chapter from the author’s latest book, ON THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Eleven Publishing, 2019. The work is an attempt at a critical understanding of the spirit of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as implemented, by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR) – starting with the appointment of the “new Court” in 1998 and up to 2016. The Court, which had begun to function in 1959, has been ever since at the intersection of the two great Western legal traditions. In this perspective, “human rights” are the procedural safety valve, a conduit to the international jurisdiction supposedly capable of resolving authoritatively what could not have been resolved domestically. It is illusory to search in this context for the “essence” of human rights since here “human rights” is practically everything that could not have been properly adjudicated at the domestic level.
